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Carnegie Mellon Study: Visas, Legalization and Enforcement<!–END ARTICLE TITLE–>
</h3><h4><i>by <a href=”http://discuss.ilw.com/content.php?7114-Article-Private-Refugee-Sponsorship-Gains-Crucial-New-Support-by-Matthew-La-Corte#bio”>
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Steven Kopits
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<p>
Researchers at Carnegie Mellon University recently released
<a
href=”https://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/bkovak/kovak_lessem_CRNYU.pdf”
target=”_blank”
>
a study
</a>
examining the impact of increasing the number of migrant work visas on the
flow of unauthorized immigrants to the U.S. We highlight some key findings.
</p>
<p>
<strong>Legalization amplifies the effects of enforcement</strong>
</p>
<p>
The authors write:
</p>
<blockquote>
<p>
<em>
[Legal] entry bans for deported individuals are ineffective at
current rates of legal immigration, but…increased legalization
rates would amplify the deterrent effects of deportation.
</em>
</p>
<p>
<em>
[Increasing] the deportation rate reduces the rate of unauthorized
migration to the U.S. and the cumulative number of years a
potential migrant spends living in the U.S. as an unauthorized
immigrant. However, even with very high deportation rates, the
policy of excluding those with prior deportations has minimal
effect on rates of unauthorized migration because the baseline
probability of obtaining legal status is so low. Only when the
probability of gaining legal status is much higher than that
currently observed does the legal entry ban policy measurably
reduce unauthorized migration. These findings confirm the
importance of losing the opportunity to legally move to the U.S.
and highlight the interactions between enforcement and visa
policies.
</em>
</p>
</blockquote>
<p>
This is the carrot and stick problem of which we have written in earlier
posts. Because there is no chance at the carrot of compliance, all the
emphasis falls to the stick of enforcement. But enforcement is many cases
not terribly effective because the migrant often has little to lose by
being apprehended by Border Patrol. It is an asymmetric value proposition.
Prospective crossers can, however, be deterred by the prospect of obtaining
or retaining legal status, as in the case of market-based visas. The
Carnegie Mellon study shows that each 1% increase in the possibility of
gaining legal status leads to about a 4% decline in the propensity to
immigrate illegally. If this relationship were linear (it’s not), a 20%
chance of gaining legal status would effectively end the inclination to
come across illegally. In the case of MBVs, all those who can pass an H2
background check could qualify for an H-2M market based visa, probably
close to 95% of the population. Thus, market-based visas should effectively
end attempts at illegal immigration for all but felons, drug smugglers
(most of whom come through official entry points nowadays) and illegal
immigrants of convenience, that is, those who live close to the border away
from official crossing points, come over for a day’s work, and can’t be
bothered with the associated paperwork and bureaucracy, to give just one
example.
</p>
<p>
<strong>Simultaneous, not sequential</strong>
</p>
<p>
While conservatives often demand enhanced enforcement as a prerequisite for
any sort of legalization, the study authors argue that simultaneous
implementation is likely to be more successful.
</p>
<blockquote>
<p>
<em>
[One school of thought calls for] reductions in unauthorized
migration prior to increasing the options for legal migration. This
sequential approach is implemented in practice either through the
use of “trigger” clauses within a single piece of legislation or by
proposing legislation focused exclusively on enforcement prior to
separate legislation expanding the options for legal immigration.
While there may be other justifications for the sequential
approach, our findings suggest that achieving a target reduction in
unauthorized migration will be more costly in the absence of
increased legal access to the U.S. than when implementing both sets
of policies simultaneously.
</em>
</p>
</blockquote>
<p>
<strong>
Temporary visas deter almost as well, but with many fewer migrants
</strong>
</p>
<p>
The authors find that temporary visas are almost as effective as permanent
residency at deterring illegal border crossing, but result in a much lower
migrant headcount.
</p>
<blockquote>
<p>
<em>
[Our] analysis shows that permanent legal status and temporary
visas drive similar reductions in unauthorized immigration, but the
latter increases the stock of authorized immigrants by far less.
</em>
</p>
<p>
<em>
We estimate the model using data from the Mexican Migration Project
(MMP), which provides unparalleled detail regarding the migration
histories of migrants between Mexico and the U.S. Importantly, the
MMP data include information on the timing of migration events and
changes in legal status, showing that many migrants move
temporarily and repeatedly, making the dynamic nature of the model
essential to accurately understand the implications of migration
policy for migration decisions.
</em>
</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>
<em>
Thus, in the presence of a legal entry ban policy, the temporary
visa program amplifies the deterrent effect of enforcement policies
by creating a valuable legal alternative. The temporary visas
provide an effective deterrent because many immigrants seem to
prefer relatively short stays in the U.S. even absent policy
incentives to do so. [The MPP database] shows that 65% of migrant
spells in the U.S. last less than 3 years, so for a substantial
share of potential migrants the 3-year limit on the simulated work
visas may not be binding.
</em>
</p>
<p>
<em>
Therefore, in certain contexts, temporary work visa programs may
provide a more politically feasible means of providing legal access
to the U.S. labor market while still amplifying the deterrent
effects of immigration enforcement policies.
</em>
</p>
</blockquote>
<p>
Virtually across the board, the DC policy analysis community cannot see a
migrant without feeling a need to offer full amnesty. Take for example,
Mark Krikorian, Executive Director of the Center for Immigration Studies,
in a
<a
href=”https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2014/02/10/enforcement-then-amnesty/”
target=”_blank”
>
2014 piece
</a>
outlining the Center’s migrant policy:
</p>
<blockquote>
<p>
<em>
[Amnesty] would be a risk worth taking [subsequent to the
implementation of] a new enforcement paradigm.
</em>
</p>
<p>
<em>
Who should benefit from such an amnesty? The bulk should be people
without criminal convictions who have U.S.-born children or
U.S.-citizen or legal-resident spouses…add to that adult
illegals…and… it would be fair to estimate, then, that out of
an illegal population shrunk by attrition to 10 million people,
some 6 or 7 million would qualify for amnesty.
</em>
</p>
<p>
<em>
Amnesty beneficiaries should get green cards — i.e., become regular
legal immigrants who can, if they qualify, become citizens
</em>
</p>
</blockquote>
<p>
For those who may not know, CIS represents perhaps the hardest line against
illegal immigration. Nevertheless, CIS is <em>well to the left </em>of both
Princeton Policy Advisors and study results with respect to handing out
permanent residencies. One can nary find policy analysts left or right in
Washington who, if they cannot deport the undocumented, do not want to
shower them with green cards. This is an unabashedly American-centric view
of the world. Notwithstanding, many Latin Americans like their own
countries, languages, families, and communities. They would just like to
earn more money in the US to improve their standard of living. Of course,
most would happily accept permanent US residency or citizenship if it were
offered to them. But that is not what they <em>need</em>. They need a
predictable, convenient, and controlled way to access the US labor market
on demand for a finite period of time safe in the knowledge that they will
not be arrested, harassed or deported. This is one key implication of the
study and a central tenet of market-based visas. Market-based visas do not
provide a path to permanent residency — they <em>cannot</em> as a function
of relying on a market price. But they do provide on-demand access for
those seeking to work in the US for a limited period.
</p>
<p>
To recap: The
<a
href=”https://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/bkovak/kovak_lessem_CRNYU.pdf”
target=”_blank”
>
Carnegie Mellon study
</a>
highlights that temporary visas which provide increased legal access the US
labor market will 1) <em>improve enforcement outcomes</em> without 2)
<em>
swamping the US with millions of new migrants resulting from offering
permanent residency
</em>
Those are two central goals of a market-based approach: a closure of the
southwest border to illegal immigration while limiting migrant headcount
growth.
</p>
<p>
Finally, I think study achieves an additional key, but indirect, goal.
Notably, the study helps move us past the sterile and ossified debate in DC
and towards one focusing more on data, models and analysis in the hopes of
elevating the discussion to one based on policy trade-offs rather than the
supposed virtues or vices of Latin American migrants.
</p>
<p>
Well done to the team from Pittsburgh.
</p>
<p>Reprinted with permission.</p>
<hr/><h4>
<a name=”bio”></a>
About The Author<br/>
</h4>
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<p>
<b>Steven Kopits</b> For most of his career, Mr. Kopits served as a strategic management consultant and investment banker in Hungary and the United States. His work has focused primarily on the private sector, with some sector consulting for the governments of Hungary, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States. He developed expertise in the management of black market issues working in Hungary after the fall of communism there.
While in Hungary, Mr. Kopits served, among others, as a Director of Financial Advisory Services at Deloitte & Touche, and later as Managing Director of T-Venture Hungary, Deutsche Telekom’s corporate venture arm. He also served on the boards of several companies, both public and private.
In the US, Mr. Kopits served as an investment banker at Dahlman Rose & Co., and then as Managing Director for Douglas Westwood Ltd., a UK-based consultancy specializing in the energy sector.
He holds an undergraduate degree from Haverford College, an MBA in Finance and Accounting, and a Masters specializing in International Economics from the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University.
He writes frequently on policy topics for a variety of publications, including Foreign Policy and The National Interest, and is a regular contributor to CNBC and The Hill, for whom he writes principally on topics related to illegal immigration.
</p>
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