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Current Dangers to returning Mexicans in the El Paso Port of Repatriation
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</h3><h4><i>by <a href=”http://discuss.ilw.com/articles/articles/393637-article-current-dangers-to-returning-mexicans-in-the-el-paso-port-of-repatriation-by-robert-kirkland-and-duncan-breda#bio”>
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Robert Kirkland and Duncan Breda
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<p>
<strong>Introduction:</strong>
</p>
<p>
The purpose of this article is to examine the current security situation in
the Ciudad Juárez area, the increased levels of violence and how this poses
a danger to returning Mexicans who use the El Paso Port of Repatriation.
Violence levels in Juárez have increased greatly in the past year due to
the increased activity of the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) in
the area. The CJNG is by most accounts the most powerful cartel in Mexico
and is involved in nearly every part of Mexico that is currently
experiencing elevated violence. The CJNG has aggressively sought control of
border plazas where illegal narcotics come into the United States.
Recently, the CJNG has entered the scene in Juárez in supporting La Linea
Cartel in an attempt to push the dominant Sinaloa Cartel out of the area.
This conflict zone has resulted in significant increases in violence and
instability which has a direct effect on returning Mexicans.
</p>
<p>
<strong>Repatriation Process:</strong>
</p>
<p>
When a Mexican is repatriated, they fall under local repatriation
arrangements signed by both U.S. and Mexican government officials designed
to strengthen the bilateral framework for the protection of Mexican
citizens being returned to Mexico, improve the efficient use of limited
resources, and increase coordination during the repatriation process [1].
</p>
<p>
When returning Mexicans repatriated, some take transportation away from the
port of repatriation. However, the majority, because of limited means, are
forced to live in the local area to work and formulate plans for the
future. These returned Mexicans are vulnerable and are exposed to the
violence endemic in the various repatriation areas.
</p>
<p>
<strong></strong>
</p>
<p>
<strong>Cartel Violence to Repatriated Mexicans</strong>
</p>
<p>
There has been a great deal of media reporting regarding returning Mexicans
with long residences in the United States. Deportees, especially ones who
have had a long time dwelling in the U.S., experience disorientation upon
entering Mexico. This makes them vulnerable to a much greater extent by
organized crime because they are unfamiliar with their surroundings [2].
The U.S. Government’s Congressional Research Service has expressed concern
of the vulnerability that recent deportees face in Mexico due to extortion
by criminal cartels and gangs [3].
</p>
<p>
The Los Angeles Times, among other news outlets, have reported extensively
on the dangers deportees face. Criminal organizations have lookouts track
new arrivals from the moment they enter Mexico. Gunmen intercept deportees
at migrant shelters, buses, and outside money-transfer businesses. They
hold them for ransom, recruit them into gangs, and sometimes assault,
torture, and “disappear” them. Church-run shelters and social service
groups, once safe ground, no longer are [4].
</p>
<p>
Recent returnees also face the threat of kidnapping due to the perception
that friends and relatives who have money and live in the U.S. can be
compelled to come to the aid of the deportee. Felipe Durand, an immigration
expert at Mexico’s University of Guadalajara, told the Washington Post that
“Kidnappers know that deportees have relatives and family members in the
U.S. who can be extorted [5].”
</p>
<p>
<u></u>
</p>
<p>
<strong>Violence in Ciudad Juárez </strong>
</p>
<p>
For the last five years the CJNG has been rapidly expanding throughout
Mexico. They have been fighting a multifront war in nearly all parts of
Mexico in order to operate freely in more territory, control production
supply lines, and dominate border cities along the US-Mexico corridors [6].
The CJNG has been focused in particular on Juárez to drive out their
primary regional rival, the Sinaloa Cartel and using the La Linea Cartel as
their local surrogate. According to Daniel Borunda of the El Paso Times,
there have been over 300 murders in Juárez in 2020, including over 90 in
March due to this conflict [7].
</p>
<p>
On top of the already heightened tensions between the warring cartels, the
global pandemic of COVID-19 has led to a decrease in precursor chemicals
for methamphetamine and fentanyl production and has thus increased the
violence surrounding the control of these limited supplies.
</p>
<p>
Violence has also spiked in the immediate area outside of Juárez. This feud
is what led to the massacre of nine American citizens who were traveling in
a caravan in November 2019 near the Chihuahua-Sonora border. According to
Mexican authorities, La Linea gunmen mistook their vehicles for a convoy of
the Sinaloa cartel cell known as Los Salazar. Experts expect the bloodshed
both in Juárez and the larger Mexican State of Chihuahua as a whole to
continue given the stakes involved in both securing the Juárez corridor and
the border drug-staging areas [8].
</p>
<p>
<strong>Conclusion</strong>
</p>
<p>
Violence levels in Juárez have increased greatly in the past year due to
the increased activity of the CGNG in the Juárez area. Many returning
Mexicans who are forced to use the El Paso Port of Repatriation do not have
the means to immediately leave the area. As a result, they are increasingly
likely to become victims of the elevated violence which has characterized
the area. The fear of kidnapping for ransom or human trafficking,
extortion, and violence is a daily reality to those repatriated Mexicans
who are forced to remain in Juárez and there is no sign that these concerns
will abate in the near term.
</p>
<p>
<strong></strong>
</p>
<p>
<strong>Endnotes:</strong>
</p>
<p>
[1] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Updated U.S.-Mexico Local
Repatriation Agreements,” February 26, 2016, accessed at:
<a
href=”https://www.dhs.gov/publication/updated-us-mexico-local-repatriation-arrangements”
>
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/upda…n-arrangements
</a>
</p>
<p>
[2] “In Tijuana, Mexicans Deported by U.S. Struggle to Find ‘Home,’”
National Geographic News. Accessed at:
<a
href=”http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/special-features/2014/11/141121-tijuana-deportees-immigrants-mexico-border/”
>
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/n…mexico-border/
</a>
. See also: “Deported to Mexico, A Lost Generation.” The Guardian. Accessed
at:
<a
href=”http://www.theguardian.com/global/2015/may/17/deported-to-mexico-immigration-america”
>
http://www.theguardian.com/global/20…ration-america
</a>
</p>
<p>
[3] “Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry.”
Congressional Research Service, April 19, 2016. Accessed at:
<a href=”https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42138.pdf”>
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42138.pdf
</a>
<u></u>
</p>
<h1>
</h1>
<h1>
[4] “Deportees to Mexico’s Tamaulipas preyed upon by gangs,” Los Angeles
Times, September 8, 2012. Accessed at:
<a
href=”https://www.latimes.com/local/la-xpm-2012-sep-08-la-me-deportee-danger-20120909-story.html”
>
https://www.latimes.com/local/la-xpm…909-story.html
</a>
</h1>
<p>
[5] “U.S. flying deportees deep into Mexico, over dangerous border,”
Washington Post, July 31, 2013. Accessed at:
<a
href=”https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-flying-deportees-deep-into-mexico-over-dangerous-border/2013/07/31/ec4abe38-f930-11e2-a954-358d90d5d72d_story.html?utm_term=.ca900d6de29c”
>
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world…=.ca900d6de29c
</a>
</p>
<p>
[6] Al Jazeera. “Mexico Murder Rate Hits Record High in 2019.” Mexico News
| Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, January 21, 2020.
<a
href=”https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/mexico-murder-rate-hits-record-high-2019-200121053841365.html”
>
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/…053841365.html
</a>
. See also: Evans, Zachary. “Mexican Homicide Rate Hits Record High in New
President’s First Year in Office.” National Review. National Review,
January 21, 2020.
<a
href=”https://www.nationalreview.com/news/mexico-homicides-hit-record-high-in-new-presidents-first-year-in-office/”
>
https://www.nationalreview.com/news/…ear-in-office/
</a>
</p>
<p>
[7] Daniel Borunda, “C-4 Explosive Turn in At Gun Buyback in Juarez
Mexico,” El Paso Times, March 12, 2020, accessed at:
<a
href=”https://www.elpasotimes.com/story/news/local/juarez/2020/03/12/c-4-explosive-turned-gun-buyback-juarez-mexico/5025732002/”
>
https://www.elpasotimes.com/story/ne…co/5025732002/
</a>
</p>
<p>
[8] Julian Resendiz, “Old Juarez Cartel closing in on ‘The Jaguar,’ Sinaloa
Cartel Rivals, Border Report, April 10, 2020, accessed at:
<a
href=”https://www.borderreport.com/hot-topics/border-crime/old-juarez-cartel-closing-in-on-the-jaguar-sinaloa-cartel-rivals/”
>
https://www.borderreport.com/hot-top…cartel-rivals/
</a>
</p>
<hr/><h4>
<a name=”bio”></a>
About The Author<br/>
</h4>
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<p>
<b>Robert Kirkland</b>
is a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel and operational
Latin American Foreign Area Officer. He has a B.S. from the United States
Military Academy, West Point and a M.A. and Ph.D. in Latin American history
from the University of Pittsburgh. He also has a graduate certificate in
Latin American Studies from the Center for Latin American Studies at the
University of Pittsburgh. He has provided expert testimony on drug cartel
and gang violence in Mexico and Central America since his retirement from
the Army in 2014. He can be reached at
<a href=”mailto:info@robertkirklandconsulting.com”>
info@robertkirklandconsulting.com
</a>
</p>
<p>
<b>Duncan Breda</b> is an investigator for the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command at Fort Bliss outside of El Paso, Texas. He is a graduate of St. Edwards University in Austin, Texas where he earned a BS in Criminology.
</p>
<p>
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
</p>
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